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We present a methodology for improving credit scoring models by distinguishing two forms of rational behaviour
of loan defaulters. It is common knowledge among practitioners that there are two types of defaulters, those who do
not pay because of cash ﬂow problems (‘Can’t Pay’), and those that do not pay because of lack of willingness to
pay (‘Won’t Pay’). This work proposes to differentiate them using a game theory model that describes their beha-
viour. This separation of behaviours is represented by a set of constraints that form part of a semi-supervised
constrained clustering algorithm, constructing a new target variable summarizing relevant future information.
Within this approach the results of several supervised models are benchmarked, in which the models deliver the
probability of belonging to one of these three new classes (good payers, ‘Can’t Pays’, and ‘Won’t Pays’). The
process improves classiﬁcation accuracy signiﬁcantly, and delivers strong insights regarding the behaviour of
defaulters.
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Introduction
Credit scoring (Thomas et al, 2002) is one of the most widely
known applications of statistical models and data mining, whose
goal is to differentiate between customers who will pay back a
given loan, and those who will not. Classifying borrowers into
these two groups (defaulters and non-defaulters) has been the
standard approach of credit scoring from its inception. Lately,
there has been a rise in the number of statistical models that use
economic analysis and game theory to better understand the
behaviour of the relevant players in many applications. It has
been used to improve manufacturing strategies (Wang, 2007), in
credit card fraud detection (Vatsa et al, 2005), and in phishing
detection for spam ﬁltering (L’Huillier et al, 2009), to name a
few. In this paper, we present a procedure that extends applica-
tion credit scorecards by differentiating defaulters into two
groups, those who default due to the lack of willingness to repay,
and those who fail to pay because they do not have the capacity
to do so.
The relationship between lenders and their borrowers has been
studied by a number of authors modelling who are defaulters and
what are the probabilities of default. For example in the well-
known work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the authors imposed
conditions on the rationality of the players, which produce an
adverse selection game in the credit granting process. The
importance of collateral as a way of selecting customers was
also studied by Wette (1983). Both papers point out that the
drivers for the decisions of whether to request a loan and whether
to grant the request include the amount of the loan and the
collateral offered.
More recent works have focused more on reasons and
characteristics of default. Alary and Gollier (2004), using
collateral and amount lent as their main decision variables,
emphasized the moral hazard problem that lenders faced, and
showed that under certain conditions customers will default
strategically. Moffat (2005) used hurdle models to model
default, and the extent of it, also ﬁnding different levels or
intensities of default. Block-Lieb and Janger (2006) suggested
that the expectation that borrowers will be fully rational is not
true in some cases, and that it is not reasonable to assume that
all customers behave strategically. The work of Guiso et al
(2010) also focused on the reasons that drive default, and found
that there are segments of the population that default strategi-
cally, and that such behaviour is driven by economic and moral
variables. Finally, differences in default and the characteristics
of defaulters have also been studied in small business lending,
with Lin et al (2011) deﬁning four different types of default
depending on the ﬁnancial conditions of borrowers.
The literature agrees that there are different reasons for
defaulting, even though credit scoring aggregates these different
reasons into just one default class, which is normally deﬁned as
being 90 days in arrears (Thomas, 2000). Then one usually
estimates the risk of this happening in the next year. Our
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proposal is to differentiate between two types of default, for
both willingness and capacity to repay, by using ﬁrst economic
modelling, and then semi-supervised clustering. Then it is
possible to build a scoring system using supervised techniques
such as logistic regression or neural networks to predict whether
a borrower will default for each speciﬁc reason.
This paper is divided as follows: The next section presents a
game theory model that determines which combination of
collateral, loan rate charged, and borrower/lender characteristics
lead to loans being given, but then defaulted upon. The
borrowers are assumed to belong to one of two groups; those
who are unwilling to repay the loan (colloquially referred to as
‘Won’t Pays’) and those who want to repay but may default
because they do not have the capacity to repay (colloquially
called ‘Can’t Pays’).
The subsequent part of the paper shows how the behaviours
described by the economic model can be used as input for a
semi-supervised clustering procedure, which separates bor-
rowers into one of the two classes. In order to demonstrate the
usefulness of the proposed model, the resulting procedure is
applied to a dataset of actual loans in the ‘Validation and
experimental results’ section. In it, the clustering procedure is
conducted to ﬁnd which are the ‘Won’t Pay’ and which the
‘Can’t Pay’ clusters. Then, two supervised learning models
(neural networks and multinomial logistic regression) are used
on the data using the cluster labels as targets. The results of the
supervised models are benchmarked against the classical
logistic regression model based on the whole, un-clustered,
population to obtain an overall estimation of the borrowers’
credit risk, focusing on both the gains in accuracy and the
knowledge obtained. Finally, the conclusions extracted from
building such a model are outlined.
Game theory model of the loan granting process
Throughout this paper we will assume there is a set of N
borrowers that were granted a loan. Each loan is described by
a set V of different variables, stored in database X  R jV j ;
representing the different characteristics of the loan, the bor-
rower, and the evolution of the loan. There is also an outcome
variable, given by di∈ {0, 1}, associated with each xi∈X
(i∈ {1,…,N}), indicating whether borrower i defaulted on that
loan or not. Only the characteristics in V, which describe data
known before the loan was granted, can be used for classiﬁca-
tion, which we denote as Vpast⊂V, forming a dataset Xpast. The
remaining characteristics, Vfuture=V \Vpast and the correspond-
ing dataset Xfuture, consist of information that can only be used
for determining whether and for what reasons the borrower has
defaulted. The database will consist of different applicants, with
one loan per applicant, as is common in application scoring.
In general, a game is deﬁned by its players, their strategies si,
and the payoffs ui(si, s− i) of playing the various strategies in the
competitive or adversarial setting (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991),
where s− i represents the strategies played by all other players
except i. In the model of the loan granting process presented in
this work, the ﬁrst player, L, is the lender who wants to
maximize the proﬁt of lending to N potential borrowers over
two time periods.
The borrowers can be of two types, C or W, where Cs are
the ‘Can’t Pays’ who are willing to pay back the loan they
received provided they are able, and so will only default
because of the occurrence of an external shock that can
occur with probability q, that can be, for example, job loss of
the borrower. Considering that we will perform classiﬁca-
tion further on, we will refer to the types of borrowers as
either types or classes. Class W corresponds to the ‘Won’t
Pays’ who are unwilling to pay back the loan even if they
can afford to do so, and so presumably took the loan with no
intention of paying it back. We can also identify the good
payers (class P) as members of class C that are not subject to
an external shock, and thus were able to repay the loan.
The mechanism for granting loans will be the following: in
the ﬁrst period borrower i∈ {1,…,N} can ask for a loan ai1, and
the lender can agree to or refuse this request, where yi1= 1 is
accepting the loan request and yi1= 0 is refusing it. The loan is
paid at the next period together with the interest, at an interest
rate of r, charged on the loan. The lender could also ask for
collateral Ci1 from the borrower i to secure the loan, where Ci1
could be, for example, the deed to the house on which a
mortgage is taken out; or the lender could grant the loan without
collateral (an unsecured loan, ie Ci1= 0). If the loan is not repaid,
the lender will sell the collateral but will only get an amount αCi1
back, with α∈ [0, 1], so (1−α) is the so-called ‘haircut’ on the
collateral. Borrowers of type C will not be able to repay if they
have had a shock to their cash ﬂow during the period, while
those of typeW will not pay no matter what their cash ﬂow is.
We assume that a shock leads to default, and if no shock
occurs then borrowers from class C will always repay. On the
basis of this assumption we can focus our analysis of the
decision process just on the marginal income that the loan
brings to the borrowers. Our assumption occurs in segments in
which income is concentrated in a narrow range, a common
occurrence for micro-entrepreneurs and low-income consu-
mers, as we will show in the experimental section below.
If the loan is repaid, the borrower can repeat the process in the
second period asking for a loan of value ai2 which, if it is given,
will correspond to decision yi2=1 by the lender, as opposed to
yi2= 0 if refused. The interest rate remains r, but the collateral
this time would be Ci2. If the loan is not repaid in the ﬁrst period,
the borrower will not be granted a new loan in the second period.
If the ﬁrst loan was not granted, it is not reasonable that this
would be different in the second period, so it will not be granted
as well. The time dependence of the players’ utility is given by
discount rates deﬁned to be δL, δC, and δW for the lender and the
two types of borrowers, respectively.
If we do not restrict the total amount of money that the lender
has available, then this procedure can be considered as a series
of two-player games between the lender and each of the
individual borrowers. In this case, without loss of notation, we
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will ignore the index i of each borrower. The payoff of the two
types of borrowers and the lender, uC, uW, and uL, will depend
on the strategies s= (y1, y2, aC1, aC2, aW1) chosen, together with
the a priori probability that the borrower is in class C,
represented by θ∈ (0, 1). The lender does not know which type
the current borrower is. This is private information that the
borrower has, so this is a game with incomplete information.
The expected utility of the borrowers is the net present value
of the loans they receive, according to their type:
uC sð Þ ¼ y1 aC1 - qδCC1 - 1 - qð ÞδC 1 + rð ÞaC1ð Þ
+ 1 - qð ÞδCy1y2 aC2 - qδCC2ð
- ð1 - qÞδCð1 + rÞaC2Þ ð1Þ
uW sð Þ ¼ y1aW1 - y1δWC1 (2)
The utility of the lender is the expected value of the returns
from the loans:
uLðsÞ ¼ y1 1 - θð Þ - aW1 + δLαC1ð Þ
+ y1θ - aC1 + qδLαC1 + 1 - qð ÞδL 1 + rð ÞaC1ð Þ
+ θ 1 - qð ÞδLy1y2 - aC2 + qδLαC2ð
+ 1 - qð ÞδL 1 + rð ÞaC2Þ ð3Þ
To derive the set of conditions that the player must satisfy,
we will create a set of constraints that account for the individual
rationality of the players given what was observed to occur, that
is, we will demand that the best possible choice is to request and
grant the requested loans.
We will assume one condition for this setting: that the
strategy of granting or requesting two loans (or one in case of
borrowers in class W) is individually rational. Thus, requesting
and granting two loans has a higher utility compared with not
participating or to just requesting a loan in one period for class
C, which would bring a marginal utility equal to zero.
For the lender, the conditions are:
uL 1; 1;C1;C2; s
0
- i
 
⩾uL 1; 0;C1; 0; s0- i
  8C1;C2 (4)
uL 1; 1;C1;C2; s
0
- i
 
⩾uL 0; 0; 0; 0; s0- i
  8C1;C2 (5)
The right-hand side (RHS) of (4) is equal to:
uL 1; 0;C1;C2; s
0
- i
  ¼ θaC1 - 1 + δL 1 - qð Þ 1 + rð Þð Þ
- 1 - θð ÞaW1 + δLαC1 1 - θ + θqð Þ ð6Þ
And so (4) is equivalent to:
aC2 - 1 + δL 1 - qð Þ 1 + rð Þð Þ + 1 - qð ÞqδLαC2⩾0 (7)
(5) is equivalent to:
θ aC1 + aC2δL 1 - qð Þð Þ - 1 + δL 1 - qð Þ 1 + rð Þð Þ
- 1 - θð ÞaW1 +C1αδL 1 - θ 1 - qð Þð Þ
+ θð1 - qÞqδ2LαC2⩾0 ð8Þ
To obtain the solution space, the same analysis has to be
carried out for each borrower. For borrowers of class C, the
inequalities that must be satisﬁed are:
uC aC1; aC2; s
0
- i
 
⩾uC aC1; 0; s0- i
 
(9)
uC aC1; aC2; s
0
- i
 
⩾uC 0; 0; s0- i
 
(10)
Note that this assumes that y1= 1 and y2= 1, that is inequal-
ities (4) and (5) are satisﬁed. This is reasonable because every
other decision implies utilities of uC(0, 0, s′− i), that is, no loans
are granted.
The RHS value from (10) equals zero, so the borrower only
asks for a loan if she or he receives positive utility. Incorporat-
ing that into (10) implies:
aC1 1 - δC 1 - qð Þ 1 + rð Þð Þ
+ δCaC2 1 - qð Þ 1 - δC 1 - qð Þ 1 + rð Þð Þ
- δCqC1 - δ2C 1 - qð ÞqC2⩾0 ð11Þ
Condition (9) assumes that the expected utility that arises
from applying for a second loan must be positive, so that:
aC2⩾
δCq
1 - δC 1 - qð Þ 1 + rð ÞC2 (12)
Finally, borrowers of class W will apply for a loan if their
respective utility is greater than the discounted collateral they
would lose if they received the loan:
aW1⩾δWC1 (13)
The set of inequalities (7), (8), (11), (12), and (13) creates a
behaviour space. This set of inequalities can be interpreted as a
set of constraints that will be used to separate the behaviour of
the defaulters. A defaulter of class C desires a second loan even
though this will be refused since he or she will have defaulted,
while a defaulter of class W does not expect a second loan.
Given this set of constraints, it is now possible to actually
differentiate the defaulters: we can obtain two groups, each one
with cases that are similar (in variance) and that satisfy the
proposed constraints.
Some other interesting results that arise from the proposed
model are as follows:
● Since the left-hand side (LHS) of (5) is increasing in C1, C2,
and δL the collaterals are an incentive for the lender to grant
loans. Similarly, a lower expected return on capital, and so a
higher discount factor δL, increases the chance the loan will
be given.
● (12) and (13) show that borrowers might accept a loan even if
the collateral demanded is of greater value than the loan
itself. Such event is observed in real life, for example, when a
loan to ﬁnance a percentage of a car is secured by the value of
the car in full.
● A necessary condition for the set deﬁned by the constraints to
be non-empty is that δW< δC< δL. This is reasonable since
people who need to borrow have lower discount factors than
the lending organizations, and borrowers in class W are
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assumed to be more short-sighted than the other types of
borrowers. A high value of δW would also result in that group
being limited to very high loan amounts (relative to the
collateral), or to borrowers with no collateral.
We propose a learning model that incorporates such restrictions
in the next section.
Constrained clustering and semi-supervised methods
Constrained clustering (Basu et al, 2008) is a semi-supervised
approach to obtaining segments of a dataset incorporating
certain restrictions that must be fulﬁlled by the members of the
cluster, the members of different clusters, or the general
structure of the clusters. The term ‘semi-supervised’ refers to
the incorporation of knowledge that is not directly present in the
data—or that is known only for a limited number of cases—in
order to improve the results on the whole domain. In this
particular case, restrictions are added to a clustering procedure
so that the objective is not only to minimize intra-cluster
variance, but also to satisfy a set of conditions for each member,
or each cluster. The methodology has been applied successfully
in several ﬁelds, ranging from signal processing (Levy and
Sandler, 2008), epidemiology (Patil et al, 2006), to OR
applications (Bard and Jarrah, 2009).
There are two different approaches for constrained clustering,
as noted by Davidson and Ravi (2005), and both are based on
the concept of ‘Must-Link’ and ‘Cannot-Link’ constraints. The
ﬁrst set of restrictions indicate that two elements must be in the
same cluster, whereas the second set prohibits the presence of
two elements in the same cluster. The methods differ in the role
of restrictions: in the ﬁrst case the algorithm satisﬁes an
objective or distance function using the information from the
constraints. The best-known application of this work is by Basu
et al (2004). In the second case the constraints simply limit the
presence of elements in the same cluster. Our work uses the
second approach, with an adjustment that adds some complex-
ity: the elements in one cluster must satisfy the restrictions
against most of the elements of the other cluster. There are
algorithms that solve this particular problem, such as the
Constrained Clustering with Filtering (CCF) algorithm intro-
duced by Bravo and Weber (2011), which will be used in
this paper.
A constrained clustering model to differentiate defaulters
The constraints obtained from the economic assumptions from
previous sections can now be used to design a new objective
variable using semi-supervised methods. The overview of the
process is as follows:
1. Select defaulters from the database X, and describe them
using only the information in Xfuture, composed of variables
in Vfuture, that is, variables collected after the loan has been
granted.
2. Cluster elements into two groups, one for each type of
defaulter (C and W) using the CCF algorithm with dataset
Xfuture as input. The constraints deﬁned in the previous
section are extended now to the whole cluster, requiring that
most cases in the cluster assigned to class W have to satisfy
their own condition, Equation (13), and that elements in the
cluster assigned to class C must satisfy constraints (7) and
(10). Finally there is a cross-cluster constraint, given by the
lender condition (8), which must be satisﬁed by ‘most’ pairs
of elements in different clusters.
3. With the elements clustered, the new objective variable
extends the default variable to the new case when there are
three different cases: good payers, defaulters in class C, and
defaulters in classW.
The exact constrained clustering problem to be solved considers
two groups with centroids given by ck, k= {1, 2} and a binary
variablemi for each i∈ {1,…,N} that represents the class of the
borrower (1 for class C, 0 for class W). Since the value of the
second loan and the second collateral are not known, we will
assume they are a fraction of the original value requested (fCr
and fCol), as explained below. Since now each borrower has his
or her own variables, we will refer to the amount borrowed as
ai∈ xi, to the collateral given for the ﬁrst loan as Ci∈ xi and
ﬁnally to the interest rate paid as ri∈ xi , with xi the vector of
variables for each borrower/loan.
The problem is then to solve the following optimization
problem, adapted from the formulation presented by Dogan and
Guzelis (2006):
min
m1;m2;c1;c2;maxW ;minC
XN
i¼1
mi xi - c1k k2 + 1 -mið Þ xi - c2k k2 ð14Þ
s:t: minC⩾ð1 - θÞai 8i j mi ¼ 0
xi⩾δWCi 8i j mi ¼ 0
0⩽aið1 - δCð1 - qÞð1 + riÞÞ
´ ð1 + δCfCrð1 - qÞÞ
-CiδCqð1 + δCfCoÞ 8i j mi ¼ 1
0⩾θaið - 1 + δLð1 - qÞð1 + riÞÞ
´ ð1 + fCrδLð1 - qÞÞ
+CiαδLð1 - θð1 - qÞqδLfCoÞ
- ð1 - θÞmaxW 8i j mi ¼ 1
minC⩽θaið - 1 + δLð1 - qÞð1 + rÞÞ
´ ð1 + δLfCrð1 - qÞÞ
+CiαδLð1 - θð1 - qÞ
+ θfColð1 - qÞqδLÞ 8i j mi ¼ 1
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maxW⩾ai 8i j mi ¼ 0
c1 ¼
PN
i¼1 mixiPN
i¼1 mi
c2 ¼
PN
i¼1 ð1 -miÞxi
N -
PN
i¼1 mi
mi 2 f0; 1g 8i 2 f1; ¼ ;Ng ð15Þ
Expression (14) represents a quadratic objective function
with integer variables. The constraints (15) depend directly on
the cluster in which the elements are present, so an extensive
expression (one that does not include the mi parameters in the
description) would have to include N2 constraints, one for each
pair of elements, turning the problem intractable for large
databases.
The CCF algorithm follows a similar methodology as the
K-Means algorithm, extending the procedure for constrained
problems. In each iteration the set of constraints for each
element is checked, that is, if the element is in class C, then
Equations (11) and (12) are evaluated for the element itself, and
Equation (8) is evaluated against the extreme values arising
from the elements currently in the cluster assigned to classW. In
case the conditions are not fulﬁlled, the element is moved from
its original cluster, and if that does not solve the issue, the
elements with extreme values in both clusters are removed from
the analysis and the process is repeated. The algorithm
continues until the violations are below a threshold and the
centroid values do not move more than a given tolerance.
The elimination of cases with extreme values in each
iteration relaxes the problem. The elements in each cluster have
to satisfy the constraints against most of the elements in the
other cluster, and this is accomplished by eliminating a small
number of extreme cases in each iteration and ensuring that all
remaining cases satisfy the constraints. In the end, since the
ﬁnal cluster for each element is determined only by proximity to
centroids c1 and c2, it is possible to re-assign even the cases that
were eliminated from the clustering procedure.
One of the open questions that remain is what are the
possible values of the parameters required to estimate the
model. We propose the following values, which correspond to
realistic measures in credit risk:
● θ: This parameter represents the a priori probability of a
customer being in the class ‘Can’t Pay’. The lender can
estimate this value from historical data, using two different
approaches: In the experimental part of this paper the
proportion of defaulters among all defaulters that made a
payment until up to 2 years after the default occurred was
used as an approximation of θ. This is based on the
assumption that defaulters of type W pay back very little of
the loan or nothing at all. The second method is using the
number of instalments paid, since defaulters in class W are
expected to repay very little, if nothing at all, of the loan. In
this case the proportion of borrowers who default in the ﬁrst
instalments of the loan are an approximation of the value
1− θ. Note that this value would have to be adjusted to
account for borrowers in class C that suffer a liquidity shock
in the ﬁrst few months.
● q: This parameter represents the chance that a borrower
receives a shock to his or her income, and so is forced to
default. This value could correspond to the long-term
default rate for loans, because it is expected that in the
long term, most of the ‘Won’t Pay’ borrowers are ﬁltered
from the database. Another option (and the one used in the
experimental results section) is to discount the observed
default rate (DR) by a small amount, in order to include
the unobserved segment. A possible value would be
q= (DR⋅(1− θ)/2).
● α: The expected recovery to be extracted from the collaterals
is a known value to credit granters, with values commonly
between 40% and 60% of the collateral value (see for
example Yamashita and Yoshiba, 2010 or Jokivuolle and
Peura, 2000).
● δL: The value of the discount factor for a company should be
a known value, for example if the expected internal return
rate for the ﬁscal year is τ, then the company’s discount
factor would be 1/(1+ τ).
● δC and δW: The value of the discount factor for the customers
is more difﬁcult to determine. Individual discount factors
have been studied on several occasions with widely different
results. For example Burks et al (2008), Chabris et al (2008),
and Green et al (1994) report discount rates ranging from 0.1
to 0.9 depending on several factors, although these studies do
not focus on ﬁnancial decisions. The well-known paper of
Benzion et al (1989) gives discount factors depending on the
ﬁnancial amount at risk that ranges from 0.2 to 0.75, with a
strong dependence on both the amount at risk and the
duration of the loan. We can imply from such studies that
there is a time-value of money, which allows lending money
to occur, but that the exact value of such discount factor is
hard to measure. We propose an exogenous measure, which
limits the range of choices that a borrower has for such rate.
In many countries there is a legal limit for the annual rate that
can be charged by lenders, and this limit can be justiﬁed as a
constraint on an irrational behaviour from the borrowers
facing an extreme situation. Low tomiddle-income borrowers
intuitively understand these limits and make rational deci-
sions without them (Littwin, 2007). The maximum interest
rate allowed for loans, which represents the maximum
discount rate that any customer is legally bound to pay, can
then be a good proxy of the maximum rate a rational
borrower would accept. We proceed with the modelling
process ﬁxing that value for δC. As for δW, the value has to
be lower than that associated with customers of class C,
because their demand for the loan is more immediate. We
study a range of values in [0, δC] in the ‘Validation and
experimental results’ section.
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● Values for the second loan: Two of the parameters that must
be decided are the values for the second loan and the second
collateral. Since defaulters were not allowed to take a new
loan, these values are unknown, but they are known for the
customers who successfully paid back their loans. Good
proxies for these values are the proportions between the
amounts that were requested/granted by returning borrowers,
that is, the average value of fCr= (Second_Amount/First_-
Amount) and fCol= (Second_Collateral/First_Collateral) cal-
culated for borrowers who successfully returned granted
loans and received new ones.
Validation and experimental results
In this section we present the results of applying the proposed
approach to a dataset of loans granted at a ﬁnancial institution.
First the dataset is introduced, then we present the procedure of
constrained clustering on the defaulters from this dataset. In the
section ‘Sensitivity analysis and parameter selection’we perform
those analyses. Finally, we discuss in detail the obtained results.
Available dataset
A dataset consisting of 97 254 loans granted to mass-market,
low to middle-income independent borrowers (with a monthly
income ranging from USD 300 to USD 2000) was used. The
database originates from a Chilean public organization, and
comprises an 11-year period, from 1997 to 2007. The dataset
has a default rate of 25.2%, with each loan described by 25
different variables. One of the main characteristics of the dataset
is that the organization almost never rejected a loan: its reject
rate was just 2%, so there is little need to use reject inference.
This extremely low rejection rate also explains the very high
default rate, as will be reﬂected in the composition of the cases
in classes C and W.
The variables available for classiﬁcation, that is the ones
obtained before granting loans are as follows:
● Economic activity: The sector of the economy in which the
customer is involved (through his/her job or company). The
large number of sectors was clustered to improve interpreta-
tion of the variable, mapping the 47 different sectors to three
larger groups (Activity_A, Activity_B, and Activity_C), and
the last one was selected as a reference category.
● Ownership of housing: This shows if the customers own, rent,
or hold other types of agreements on their current home. Four
classes are recognized: Owner, Tenant, Share-Tenant (Share),
or other types. The class ‘Others’ is used as a reference.
● Number of properties: The number of properties the bor-
rower possesses. The variable was divided into three cate-
gories: No properties, one property, or two or more
properties, which was used as a reference category.
● Region of country: Division of the country into three regions,
one of them (arbitrary) used as a reference.
● With guarantor: Whether the customer has a guarantor for the
loan or not.
● Length of loan: The length of the loan requested by the
borrower. This number is determined by the customer, with
the company simply granting the loan or refusing it, so it is
not susceptible to manipulation. The durations of the loans
are between 1 and 12 months.
● Age: The age of the customer in years.
The previously presented variables describe the customer at
the moment of requesting the loan. On the other side, the
variables that describe the actual evolution of the loan are as
follows:
● Collaterals: The collaterals are described by two variables.
The ﬁrst is a dummy variable that describes whether the
customer had to give collateral on the loan (With_Collat-
erals), and the value of the collateral (Value_Collateral_UF).
The latter is given in ‘development units’ (Unidades de
Fomento, referred to as UF for their acronym in Spanish), the
Chilean inﬂation-indexed unit, that is equivalent to roughly
46 USD.
● Amount and rate: The amount of the loan, in UF, and the
total annual interest rate charged for the loan.
● Days in arrears before defaulting (Days_Arrear): The total
number of days the instalments of the loan were in arrears
before defaulting. For example, if a loan defaulted in the
fourth instalment, and the ﬁrst was paid 10 days late, the
second on time, and the third 45 days late, the variable has a
value of 55.
● Cancellations: Sometimes the institution will cancel the
payment of penalties and excess interest that arises from
arrears, upon agreement that the next instalment is paid on
time, or that a renegotiation is performed. This event is
summarized into two different variables, considering the
number of times this happened in the lifetime of the loan
(Num_Cond), and the amount that was reduced (Amount_-
Cond). In addition, if some of the interest due to be paid is
also discounted from the instalments, this value is reported in
the variable Interest_Low.
● Extensions: Sometimes the company will extend the period
of an instalment for 30 days or a similar span of time, subject
to adjustment in the amount owed. The number of times a
customer applies for this appears in variable Num_Post, and
the amount adjusted appears in Amount_Adjust, and, since
the adjustment can be positive or negative, the total amount
of negative adjustments is incorporated into Negative_Adj.
Clustering procedure
For the clustering procedure, the parameters used, their values,
and their origin are shown in Table 1.
The process is run using the 24 576 customers ﬂagged
as defaulters, normalizing the dataset with all the future
variables. The results consist of two clusters, each one
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corresponding with a class, either C or W. In the ﬁrst cluster
there are 4762 borrowers, which are assigned to Class C,
while the second cluster has 19 814 borrowers, which are
assigned to class W. The centroids for each class are shown
in Table 2. The variables associated with collaterals have a
greater impact in differentiating the clusters, even though
the difference in the percentage of customers with collaterals
is not huge (40% versus 33%). The value of the collaterals
for class C is almost nine times greater than that in class W.
Since the percentage of borrowers with collaterals are
relatively balanced between the two clusters, this result
shows that it is not whether a loan is secured or not what
differentiate defaulters, but what the value of the collateral
is, which is an interesting result.
Customers in class C request a far larger amount for their
loans, which would be consistent with a default based on the
capacity to repay. Considering the total number of days in
arrears, class C accumulates almost 100 days more than classW
before defaulting, indicating that they make a greater effort to
pay back the loans than customers in class W do. Also, they
apply for a larger number of renegotiations (0.71 per customer
on average), get greater adjustments and debt relieves, and are
more susceptible to receive a discount on their interests due
(1.18 UF per customer on average, versus 0.27). The values of
the variables suggest that there are, indeed, different behaviours
detected.
Sensitivity analysis and parameter selection
In order to analyse the sensitivity of the clustering parameters,
the procedure was run using several values of the parameters
(δW, α). The value of δW was tested in the range [0, 0.6],
following the restrictions presented in the previous section,
and α was simultaneously tested in the range [0.4, 0.6]. Para-
meter α was varied in steps of 0.05, while parameter δW was
varied in steps of 0.1.
Table 3 presents the obtained results, and shows that when
the discount factor for the ‘Won’t Pays’ (δW) is low, then the
model assigns a large number of cases to that class. This is
reasonable as a low value in the discount factor implies a more
relaxed constraint, so it is easier to satisfy the restrictions for
that class. Of greater interest is that this dependency presents
very little variation when varying parameter α for all values
except δW= 0.6, which seems to imply that after a certain
threshold, the restrictions tend to balance and more cases can be
assigned to class C. Higher values of parameter α relax the
constraints applied to classC, but this effect was not strong until
the discount factor δW reached a value of 0.5.
Considering the results obtained, the values δW= 0.5 and
α= 0.6 are selected. This is done because the number of
elements in the cluster assigned to class W decreases for
increasing values of δW within the interval (0.5, 0.6). Outside
this interval the respective number does not vary notably. This
indicates that the value of δW= 0.5 is a critical value for the
discount factor. With δW ﬁxed at 0.5, a value of α= 0.6 presents
approximately 6600 cases in class C, which is a sufﬁcient
number to ensure a valid statistical model when applying
supervised models for classiﬁcation.
Of note is the large percentage of cases assigned to classW in
comparison to class C. This suggests that willingness to repay,
not capacity to repay, is the most important factor that
determines default for the analysed data. It is to be believed
that this imbalance might be caused by three different factors:
ﬁrst, since the rejection rate of the organization is extremely
low, then it follows that the organization possessed poor
evaluation standards previous to the implementation of a
scoring system, as we know it is the case. Bravo et al (2013)
evaluated the impact of implementing a scoring system for this
organization. Second, the clustering methodology itself has an
Table 1 Parameters selected for clustering experiment
Parameters Value Origin
q 0.130 Adjusted default rate
θ 0.550 Estimated from historical return data
α 0.600 Range [0.4, 0.6]
δL 0.935 Company factor—10% inﬂation
δC 0.625 55% maximum annual rate (Central Bank)
δW 0.500 From sensitivity analysis
fCr 1.320 Examples from good payers
fCol 2.470 Examples from good payers
Table 2 De-normalized results of semi-supervised clustering
Variable Class C Class W
With_Collaterals 0.40 0.33
Amount 48.67 12.89
Days_Arrear 882.53 708.61
Num_Cond 0.27 0.37
Num_Post 0.84 0.43
Num_Reneg 0.71 0.43
Amount_Adjunt − 0.26 − 0.07
Amount_Cond 4.02 2.35
Negative_Adj 0.38 0.08
Interest_Low 1.18 0.27
Payments 2.86 2.37
Value_Coll_UF 58.93 6.59
Rate 1.10 1.10
Table 3 Percentage of cases in classW depending on parameters α
and δW
δW/α 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60
0.0 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
0.1 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
0.2 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
0.3 86.17% 85.08% 80.14% 86.17% 81.13%
0.4 74.52% 74.09% 74.32% 75.09% 75.06%
0.5 79.82% 74.56% 72.14% 71.92% 70.79%
0.6 77.99% 78.78% 78.14% 69.51% 69.58%
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impact in the imbalance of the classes, since class C has an
additional constraint that might make it harder for a case to be
assigned to it, but this can be easily measured by the sensibility
analysis performed, as we have shown in this section. A ﬁnal
factor is that loans tend to default at a constant, higher rate,
during the ﬁrst months of repayment, as shown for example in
Baesens et al (2005) and this rate ﬂattens at the ﬁnal stages of
the loan. Such cases of early default will be assigned to classW
but are actually class C cases who have defaulted early.
Combined with the second factor this will increase the number
of cases in class W.
Classiﬁcation results
In order to show the potential of our proposed approach we
apply two different procedures to the same dataset. First, we
apply standard logistic regression without differentiating
defaulters, and then we apply two methods for classiﬁcation
with three classes (C,W, and P), namely multinomial regression
and a feed-forward neural network with a Multi-layer Percep-
tron architecture.
Multinomial logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow,
2000) is the natural extension of the binomial logistic regression
model, which in turn is the most widely used technique for
building credit scorecards, as noted by Anderson (2007);
Siddiqi (2006); Thomas et al (2002). The method uses only
two logistic regressions. The ﬁrst compares classes C and W
and leads to coefﬁcients βC and the second compares P and W
and leads to coefﬁcients βP. The classiﬁcation function for each
class k, k∈ {P,C} is then:
pk xð Þ ¼
exp βk0 +
P jVpast j
j¼1 β
k
j xj
 
1 +
P
k02fP;Cg
exp βk
0
0 +
P jVpast j
j¼1 β
k′
j xj
  (16)
and for class W the classiﬁcation function is:
pk xð Þ ¼ 1
1 +
P
k02fP;Cg
exp βk
0
0 +
P jVpast j
j¼1 β
k0
j xj
  (17)
The second multinomial model used is feed-forward neural
networks, judged to be the most accurate procedure for credit
scoring according to Baesens et al (2003). Neural networks are
known black-boxes, but several adjustments can be made to the
design in order to obtain parameters that are consistent with
probabilities and that satisﬁes the legal requirements that are
common in credit scoring (De Waal et al, 2005). In particular, a
conﬁguration based on linear transfer functions and softmax
(logistic) output functions is used. In this case, a probability
matrix of dimension (|Vpast|+1)× 3 is obtained. The
classiﬁcation function for each k, k∈ {P,C,W} is:
pkðxÞ ¼
exp βk0 +
P jVpast j
j¼1 β
k
j xj
 
P
l2fP;C;Wg
exp βl0 +
P jVpast j
j¼1 β
l
jxj
  (18)
The results from both models are benchmarked against the
results from a regular logistic regression, which delivers a
unique set of parameters β ¼ ðβ0; ¼ ; β jVpast j Þ that construct
probability p(x) of being a defaulter in class D= {C,W}, a
unique class. The expression of p(x) is:
pðxÞ ¼ 1
1 + exp - β0 -
P jVpast j
j¼1 βjxj
  (19)
In order to construct the experiments, a balanced sample was
taken from database Xpast, selecting 14 286 cases representing
the three classes. Then 10-by-10 cross-validation was applied to
the dataset to obtain the parameters and their deviations (Hastie
et al, 2009). For training the neural network, an additional
step—extracting one of the folds of the cross-validation set to
search for the optimal parameter conﬁguration—was taken, a
crucial step in order to get useful results in these types of
statistical models (Zhang, 2007). Since the training is performed
100 times, a set of 100 results is obtained for both the
parameters and the performances of the models. In all tables
that are presented the ‘mean ± std. deviation’ of these results is
reported.
The results for the different models can be seen in Table 4.
The results displayed are aggregated, that is, the obtained
probabilities are transformed into defaulters and non-defaulters,
which is performed by simple addition of the probabilities of
default. This is done in order to facilitate comparison with the
binomial model, which differentiates between P and D. One
could combine the scores in other ways (Zhu et al, 2001), but
we believe that the direct methodology is the obvious approach
in this case. This comparison also takes into account the fact
that the ﬁnal goal is to have a better discrimination between
these two classes, defaulters and non-defaulters. The results
obtained are more clearly viewed when the Area Under the
Curve (AUC) is considered and the Receiver Operator Char-
acteristics (ROC) curves are plotted. Table 4 shows the AUC
that is obtained for each model, and Figure 1 displays the
comparison between the models. The proposed methodologies
obtain results that are 5–7% better than the logistic regression
model. The AUC of the two models with the two types of
defaulters are statistically insigniﬁcant in value, but both are
superior to the logistic regression. The ROC curve also shows
Table 4 AUC for the three models
Model AUC (defaulters)
Logistic regression (w/o defaulter diff.) 0.6275± 0.017
Multinomial logistic regression (w/ defaulter diff.) 0.6678± 0.004
Neural networks (w/ defaulter diff.) 0.6660± 0.004
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that the multinomial models are better at identifying defaulters
in the upper range of scores, showing a signiﬁcant difference
when more than 30% of the true positives have been detected.
This suggests the increase can be attributed to the improvement
in discriminating between the two types of defaulters. Since the
dataset was obtained given a very low rejection rate, and that
the increase in discrimination capacity comes from a better
differentiation of defaulters, the improvement that the metho-
dology brings is subject to the proportion of cases in each class
that any potential user has; a bank better at ﬁltering bad
borrowers (class W) might not see such a large increase in
default prediction, whereas an institution with lower standards
(as the one used in this example) will observe better results.
In Tables 5, 6a and 6b the parameters from the experiments
can be observed. The ﬁrst conclusion that can be drawn from
the parameters is their low standard deviation, hinting to very
stable solutions. The improvement in classiﬁcation can be
explained by those variables whose β parameters for good
payers lies in between the respective parameters for classes C
andW as happens, for example, with the variable ‘Tenant’. This
variable is not signiﬁcant in the binomial logistic regression
model. It is though in the other two models, with both models
showing that being a tenant is a characteristic present for
customers who do not have the capacity to repay, and that it is
a neutral characteristic for good payers. Owning a house, in
turn, is not a characteristic of customers with lack of willingness
to pay. Another example is the variable ‘Guarantor’. Having a
guarantor means one is more likely to want to pay, reﬂected by
the negative coefﬁcient from classW. Of course, the lender may
create this effect by only requiring guarantors from borrowers
who the lender thinks may not be able to repay.
Borrowers in class W usually ask for longer terms, and
adding this to the smaller amounts that they borrow implies an
interesting behaviour: a customer who may default because he
or she does not want to pay will borrow a small amount of
money repaid with small instalments, contrasted with borrowers
of class C who are prone to a greater risk given that the amount
in each instalment is larger.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we introduced a novel methodology that
provides opportunities to improve credit scoring systems.
Its key ideas are to describe the behaviour of borrowers
using economic modelling, which subsequently leads to
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Figure 1 ROC curves for the three proposed models.
Table 5 β parameters obtained from neural network training with
defaulter differentiation
Variable P C W
Activity_A 0.06± 0.01 − 0.29± 0.03 0.16± 0.02
Activity_B 0.05± 0.01 − 0.16± 0.02 0.09± 0.01
Owner 0± 0 − 0.1± 0.62 − 0.07± 0.01
Tenant − 0.09± 0.01 0.28± 0.03 − 0.21± 0.02
Middle_Own − 0.09± 0.01 0.21± 0.03 − 0.12± 0.02
No_Property − 0.15± 0.02 0.07± 0.03 0.11± 0.01
One_Property − 0.05± 0.01 0.01± 0.01 0.04± 0.01
Region_1 − 0.17± 0.02 0.16± 0.03 − 0.03± 0.01
Region_2 0.12± 0.02 − 0.21± 0.03 0± 0
Guarantor 0.06± 0.01 0.09± 0.01 − 0.15± 0.02
Term − 0.44± 0.18 − 0.45± 0.46 1.12± 0.18
Age 7.31± 1.13 3.91± 1.88 − 11.99± 1.93
Table 6 β parameters obtained from logistic regression models,
with and without defaulter differentiation
(a) Multinomial regression
Variable P C
Activity_A 0.36± 0.04 − 0.4± 0.05
Activity_B − 0.25± 0.02 − 1.37± 0.03
Owner − 0.08± 0.02 − 0.71± 0.02
Tenant 0.18± 0.02 0.55± 0.03
Middle_Own 0.31± 0.03 1.46± 0.03
No_Property 0.03± 0.04 1.01± 0.04
One_Property − 0.76± 0.01 − 0.14± 0.02
Region_1 − 0.25± 0.03 − 0.11± 0.03
Region_2 − 0.43± 0.03 0.55± 0.02
Guarantor 0.29± 0.02 − 0.69± 0.03
Term 0.62± 0.02 0.72± 0.03
Age − 0.41± 0.05 − 0.29± 0.06
(b) Binomial regression
Variable Defaulter
Activity_A 0.33± 0.04
Activity_B − 0.29± 0.02
Owner − 0.27± 0.02
Tenant 0± 0.02
Middle_Own 0.39± 0.03
No_Property 0.39± 0.03
One_Property 0.69± 0.02
Region_1 0.2± 0.02
Region_2 0.73± 0.03
Guarantor − 0.56± 0.03
Term − 0.25± 0.03
Age 0.19± 0.04
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restrictions that via constrained clustering reveal differ-
ences among defaulters, a pattern that to the best of our
knowledge has not been exploited so far. The combined
applications of data mining, statistical analysis, and game
theory are being used in a large number of ﬁelds, and we
present how they also show promise in ﬁnancial analysis,
where the behaviour of different agents is key.
The results show a signiﬁcant improvement over the
classic methodology, with a 6% average increase in dis-
crimination capacity, which can be fairly signiﬁcant con-
sidering the amounts involved in consumer lending.
However, an even greater contribution is identifying the
two types of defaulters. Their characteristics bring interest-
ing information about how the types of defaulters behave
and can be detected. That knowledge can be used to improve
the basic requirements for loans, or to detect risk segments
of the portfolios in order to improve collecting campaigns.
Better understanding of these segments also has the poten-
tial to lower the overall risk present in the portfolios, with
large potential savings.
The procedure in this work focused on applying semi-
supervised techniques to identify unknown patterns, aided
by a simple decision process extracted from economic
modelling. This research can be extended by designing
more complex games that reﬂect the decision processes that
defaulters make in greater detail, for example focusing on
capturing irrational behaviours using behavioural econom-
ics. Some results in this setting can be seen for example in
the work of Benton et al (2007), among others. A second
approach would be to calculate a general equilibrium, using
an endogenous decision process rather than an exogenous
differentiation of defaulters. In both cases a careful estima-
tion of a set of constraints that would allow for knowledge
discovery techniques to be applied would have to be
performed, since a complex economic model will lead to
equilibria that are not easily transformed to constraints as
was the case in our work. Another extension would be, if
possible, to obtain the actual reason for default of a given
dataset, even if it is a small fraction of defaulters, and
developing a more empirical model given this new data. The
model can then be adjusted to incorporate the new informa-
tion, hopefully leading to stronger results.
Finally, the main conclusion of this work is that traditional
credit scoring can, and should, be improved by the use of more
sophisticated techniques. The current developments in the ﬁelds
of statistics, economics, and behavioural analysis are powerful
tools that are available for researchers and practitioners.
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